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Abstract
Th e Sarblln e .\' - Oxh~y A CI and Ih e Securilies Exchange Commission mo ve 100
quickly when Ih ey prod Ih e Filloncial ACCOllllfillg SUllldards Board, the
.\"UlI1dard seifer f or US GAAP, 10 //love i/llmedim ely 10 {/ principles -based
system. Priorities respectil1g reform o.f corporate reporling in1he
need to be
ordered more care.fidly. Incenfi ve probfems impairing audi1 peliormance
should be solved ji rs1 !hraIl gh ins!i 1IIt iOl1ll1 reform i I1.Hllo! ing the aud il frol1l Ihe
negative impact of rent-seekin g alld solving adl'crse seleclion problems
othe rwise affecting audit practice. So long liS ollditor independence lIlld
1I1{/1wge1l1f!llt il/ celllipes respecting lI CCO llllfil1 g freaf/llents reI/will slispect. Ihe
US reporting system holds Oll! 110 actor plausibly posifiul1ed 10 take responsibili1y /or Ihe delicate IOIlH oJoct applications thaI are Ihe hallmarks ofprinci pIes- based SyS fl'IIIS. Pril1 cip'e.~·. IOkel1 alone, do hl1le to cOlls frain rent-seeking
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behaviour. /11 a world of caprured regulators, they invite applications rhat sllit
the regulated actor's interests. Rules, with all their flaws, better cOllstrain
managers and compromised au.ditors. Broadbrush reformulations of rulesbased GAAP shouldial/ow Dilly when illstitutional reforms have succeeded.

Keywords: corporation and securiti es law, illegal behaviour and the enforcement of law, accounting and auditing genera l.

I.

I NTRODUCTION

American equityholders awoke in 2002 to realize they no longer could trust
corporate financial reports. I Their doubt s extended beyond Enron and the Arthur
Andersen finn! to a large set of companies with reputations for aggressive
accountin g. Entire sectors were implicated, finance and telecommunication s
most prominently. Securities issuers, oriented toward shareholder value enhancement by the corporate cultu re of the 1990s, had been adopting aggressive, even
fraudulent treatments to enhance reponed eanlings, and their auditors had been
doing nothing to stop them. The aud itors had sold their independence in
exchange for consulting rents. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
some years before, had issued loud warnings about this dillY deal and its implications for reporting quality:' But nobody in the investment community paid
attention so long as money kept falling from the sky during the 1990s bull markel.
Things were different in 2002. As equityholders struggled in the worst bear
market in a generation, diminished auditor independence triggered a crisis of

I See. e.g .. G. Morgensoll, 'Womes of More Enrons to Come Give Stock Prices a Pounding'.
N. Y. Times (30 January 2002) p. C I.
~ For a review of Enron disaster, see W.W. Brallon, 'Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder
Value', 76 7illalle L Rev. (2002) p. 1275 .
.1 See. e.g .. A. Levitt. 'Renewing the Covenant With investors' , Speech given at the New
York University Cenler for Law and Busi ness ( 10 May 2000) (available at <www.sec.gov/llews/
speechlspch> (last visited 25 January 2(04».
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({nd 'he AmeriC(l1/ Accolllltillg Crisis
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co nfid ence in corporate reporting. As audit failures· piled up, in vestors lost
confidence in ma nagers, market inte rmedi ari es, and auditors alike. Share prices
suffered as a resul t.
The audiwrs responded by poi nting a fin ger at US accoun ting's standardseller, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FAS B), and the standard s it
articul ates, Generally Accepted Accounting Principl es (GAA P). The problem,
said the auditors, was a shortage of rules. Auditors and reporting compani es
needed more guid ance and regul ators like FAS B had fail ed to supply it. Joe
Berardino, the manag ing partner of the Andersen firm , then under the gun for the
audit failure at Enron and subseq uent document shredding, led thi s counterattack. Hi s fi rm's auditors, he said, had merely appli ed the rul es. It followed that
if there was a prob lem, it lay in the rul es themselves, which pemljued the orf
ba la nce shee t finan cing arrangements that figured promin entl y in Enron's
co ll apse. If somethin g had gone wrong with the fairness of Enron's fin ancial
statements, then the rules ought to be ret hou ght :~ The burden to effect improvement lay on the FAS B and the SEC rat her than on the aud it firms: to restore contl dence, the SEC should suppl y ' immed iate gu idance' to public compani es
respecting d iscl osure of off-balance sheet transactions along wilh other
transac tional categories where Enron's fin ancials had proved wanling, such as
over the counter deri vat ive co ntracts and related- part y transacti ons. In parti cul ar,
the SEC should req uire issuers to prov ide more details respec tin g off balance
sheet guarantees, co mmitments, and lease and de bt arra nge ments thaI variously
impact on cred it ratings, earn ings, cash now, or slack price."

The decline in comp liance has nO! been limited to companies subject to e nforce ment
actions. sllch as Cendant: see I II r e Cel/da/lf Cmp. Sec Ulig .. 109 F. S upp. 2d 235 (D.N.J. 2000).
Investigat ions and cri tici sms touch reputable names sLich as Xerox: see C. Deutsch and R.
Abelson. ·Xerox Facing New Pressures Over Audit ing·. N.Y. Tillll'.I" (9 February 2001) p. CL
Lucent: S. Romero. ·Luce nt" s Boob Said to Draw Attent ion of the SEC". N.Y. Tilll!'x ( 10
February 200 I) p. C I; American Internation;ll. Coca Cola. and IB M: see S. Liesm;l ll. ·Heard o n
the Street: Deci phering the Black Box·. Woll 51. 1. (23 Jammry 20(2): and General Electric itself.
See J. Kah n . •Accounting in Wonderland: Jeremy Kahn Goes Down the Rabbi t Hole with G. E.·s
Books ·. FO/"l/ll/(' (19 March 20(1) p. 37: R.E. Siivel"llWl and K. Brown. ·Five Companies: How
T hey Get T hei r Numbers·. Wall 51.1. (23 J;muary 2002) pp. C I. C 16.
The General Accounting Office Reporlto IheChairman. Comm ittee 0 11 Banki ng. Housi ng, ;mel
Urb,Hl Affairs. U.S. Senate. Fil/(/l/citl/ RII.I·InIIlIllI'III.\": Trllll(/s. Markel IlI/pm·I.\". Rl'gu/lII(J}Y
RI'.VWI1.I·l'.I·. ami Rl'II](1illill,!:. C/wllellge.\· (October 2002) (GAO-OJ- JJ8) [hereafter cited as GA a
Rep0J"/I. surveys public company restatements 1997 to 2002. showi ng marked increases across
the period .
.< J. Berardino. ·Enron: A Wake-Up CIII·. Wall SI. J. (4 December 2001) p. A 18 .
• J. BlIrns and M . Schroeder. ·Accoull1ing Firms Ask SEC for Post-EnrOll Guide·. \Vult SI. J.
(7 January 2002) p. A I 6.
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The auditors repeated an o rr-heard refrain when they demanded more
guidance from the standard setters, and so failed to deflect the blame from
themselves. Worse, voices from outsi de the accou nting profession responded to
the auditors' defense by singing the opposite t.une: Maybe the auditors had too
much guidance; maybe the problem was nOI a shortage of rules on matters like
off-balance sheet financing, derivati ve contracts, and leases, but an excess of
rules. The critics charged that GAAP's exhausti ve sysrem of rules-based treatments had fostered a dysfunclionai , check-the-box approach to compliance.
Preparers and auditors applied the rules mechanically, ignori ng the substance of
the transactions being reported. ' The rules-based system of regulati on, they
alleged, fos tered a culture of non compliance in which reg ulated actors in vested
in schemes of rul e evas ion. Harvey Piu, then the SEC chairman, led the charge
against FASB and its rules:
'Present-day accounting standards are cumbersome and offer far too detailed prescripti ve requirements for companies and their accountants to fo llow. We seek to
move toward a principles-based set of accounting standards, where mere compli ance with technical prescriptions is neither sufficient nor the objective."

Capital Hill staffers, press commentators, and academics seconded Pin in
blaming the cris is on the rules and calling for principles-based accounting.
Even Wall Street joined the call for principles, in a rare moment of concurrence with the poli cy community. Of course, Wall Street's moti vation lay in the
assoc iation of princip les-based accounting with the Internati onal Financial
Reporting Stand ard s (IFRS) issued by the Jntern ational Accou nting Standards
Board (lASS) and se lec ted for adopti on by the European Commi ss ion .9 The
case for principles- based accou ntin g overlaps the case for regu latory interventi on to speed intern at ional securities market co nvergence, in particu lar SEC
acceptance of financial reporting pursuant to [fRS. Principles-based
accounting thus appeals to every intermediary o n Wall Street anticipating more
rents from foreign listing business.

1 S. Liesman. 'SEC Accounting Cop's Warning: Playing By Rules May Not Ward Off Fraud
Issues', Wall 51. J. ( 12 February 2002) p. CI: 'Leaders: The Lessons from Enron', Ecollollli.w (9
February 2002) pp. 9- 10 .
• H.L. Pin, Testimony Concerni ng The Corporate and Auditing Accountabil ity. Responsibility, and Transparence Act, Committee on Fi nancial Services. House of Representatives p. 5.
Avai lable on the SEC website at <http: www.sec.gov/news/testintony/032002tsh lp.htm> (last
visited 26 January 20(4) .
• Effective in 2005, li sted companies in the EC will be requ ired to report under lFRS .
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The way Ihus prepared , [he US Congress made its own call for principles
when il enacted the Sarbanes-Ox ley Act of 2002 (SOA),'" the legislation that
addresses th e reportin g cri sis and auempts to res tore confidence in the securities
markets. SOA institutes a new reg im e of reg ulation of the accounting profession , following the standard reg ulatory strategy of delegat ing the task of fillin g
in the new regime's term s to a new administrative agency , the Public Company
Accounting O versight Board (PCAOB). " On principles-based accounting, in
contrast, SOA relies on the o ld agency , th e SEC, ordering it to produce a stud y
of the US accounting system th at ascerlain s the extent to whi ch it is principlesbased (as opposed to rul es- based) and reports on the length of time needed to
achi eve transition to a basis in principl es. '! The SEC Report, wh ich has
appea red in du e course, II co nfirm s the relali ve superiority of principles-based
over rutes- based acco untin g and hands to FASB the job of a gro und up
reconstructi on of US GAAP.

'" Sarbanes-Oxley ACI of 2002. Pub. Law . 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scatte red
secti ons of II . 15. IS. 28, and 29 U .S.c.).
" Sarbanes-Ox ley Act s. 103 (c),
'! Sarbane~ -Ox l ey Act s. lOS (d) provides as follow s:
SEC. lOS. ACCOUNTI NG STA NDARDS.
(dl STUDY AND REPORT ON A DOPTING PRI NCIPLES-BASED ACCOUNTINGI I) STU DY (A) IN GENERAL - The Commission shall conduct a study on the adoption by the Un ited States
fi nanc ial reporting sy:-tem of a principl es-based accounting system.
(B) ST UDY TOPICS - The st udy required by subparag.raph (A) shall include an exami nation of(i ) the extent to which principles-based accounti ng. and financial reporting. exists in the United
States:
(ii ) the length of time required for change from a ru les-based \0 a principles-bm;ed financial
reporting system:
(i ii) the feas ibility of and proposed methods by which a principles· hascd !-iystem may be implemented; and
(iv) a thorough economic ana lysis of the illlpkrne nl:uinn of a pri lKiples-based syslem.
(2) REPORT - Not later than I year ,Ifter 1IlL' d ;I(~ Ilf e n:H: ( IIl~n( M [hi s Act. the Commission shall
submit a report on the results of the study r~l]uir..: d hy p;II':I~r:lrh ( I) to theComminee on Banking..
]'!ou:-ing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Commillee on Financial Services of the HOlLse
of Representatives.
S. 10S(d) is coupled wilh s, 108(a). which r~l]lIil"l':s FASB :md a ny other approved standardsselling body 10 adopt procedures assuri nf! promptl'tlllsideration of new rule~ refleclin g 'i nternalionnl convergence on high quality accounting st:mdards.'
" Office of the Chief Accountant. Oflice or Economic Analysis, SEC. Study Pursuant to
Section IOS(d) of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 on the Adopt ion by the Uni ted Slates Finnllcial
Reporting System of a Principles- Based Accouting. Sy:-tem (J uly 2003). avail abl e a t <http://
www.sec.gov/news/st udies/principle basedstand .htl1l> [hereafter cited as SEC Rl.'fJo/"/1 (last
visited 26 January 2004).
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Thi s Article enters a dissenting opinion. The dissent does not follow from a
theoretical preference for rules over princip les, however. [n theory there need be
nothing objectionable in an initiative that privi leges pri nciples over rules in the
articulation of accounting standards (or, for that matter, any other regulation).
Principles, or in lawyer's parlance 'standards'. lead to more responsive and
flexible regulation. The lawmaker announces a broad-brush directive in the
expectation that more particular in structions will derive from law to fact applications over time. Because the principle guides each application to fact, princip lesbased standards allow regulators to stay in closer touch with ultimate regulatory
objectives even as they allow for variations in the facts of the cases. In contrast,
rules-based systems tend toward formali sm, even as they also tend to include
statements of overarching principles. Whatever their motivating principles,
exhaustively articulated rules that treat, categorize and distinguish complex transactions invite mechanical application. In practice, the statement of the rule can
come to dominate both the wider regulatory purpose and the particulars of (he
given case. Problems result, si nce no system of rules ever can anticipate all future
cases. Clever planners exploit the pattern of mechanical appli cation, devising
transactions that fit the pattern but evade the regulation's spi rit. US GAAP is
justifiably famous for reliance on such rule-based treatments.
In the abstract, then, well-drafted principles may offer a better mode for
articulati ng accounting standards. Unfortunately, the US reporting system's
infirmities cannot be cured in the abstract. GAAP's rule-based treatmenrs and
(he proposed move to principles must be evaluated in the process context in
which preparers and auditors apply accounti ng principles. The process picture
is not pretty. Professional standards have fallen to such a low estate that a near
term shift to a princip les-based sys tem would create a sign ifi cant risk of unintended adverse conseq uences.
Management decides on accounting treatm ents and prepares financial
reports. Auditors merely review these deci sion s. '~ It follows in theory that
auditors should be the most independent and adversary of professionals, ready
at all times to reject management's treatments as unfair or noncompliant.
Unfortunately, in US practice, corporate clients have captured the loyalty of
their audilOrs to a degree comparable to their capture of the loyalty of their
lawyers. Multiple factors contribute to this compromise of the professio nal
relationship. Prime among them are non audit consulting re nts, employmenl

I. The leading discussion of the resul ting incentive problem in the legal literature is M.A.
Eisenberg. 'Legal Models of Managemem Structure in the Modern Corporation: Officers,
Directors and Accountams· . 63 Clil. L Rev. ( 1975) p. 375. Eisenberg's critique continues to
resonate in 2004.

Rilles, Principles, {/lid the American AccoLlllting Crisis
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opportun iti es at client s, and audit industry conce ntralion. ' ~ Now, had the
Cong ress enact in g SOA been se ri ous a bout reali gning auditor ince nt ives and
ame li orating th eir capture by the client interest, the statute wou ld have prohibited all nonaudit forms of bus in ess consulting by audit firm s. SOA, more
cauti ously, opts for gradual improvement th rough periodic profess ional rev iew.
It facilitates audit reform without assuri ng it, leaving it to th e PCAOB and the
SEC to ad dress (or finesse) the problem of industry capture.
So long as management incentives respecting accounting treatments and
auditor inde pendence remain suspect, the US reportin g system holds out no actor
plausibl y positioned to take responsibility for the delicate law to fact applications
th at are the hallmark s of principles-based systems. Principles, taken alone, do
lillie to constrain rent-see king behaviour. In a world of captured regulators, they
invite app li cation s that suit the regulated actor's interests. Rules, with all their
flaws, beller constrain manage rs and their compromi sed aud itors.
Prin ci pl es-based accountin g Illay work well in other corporate govern ance
systems or in the US sys tem at so me fu ture time. But Co ngress and the SEC
move too qu ickl y in prodd ing FASB to mo ve immediately to principles-based
GAAP. Priorities here need to be ord ered wi th more care. The ince nti ve
problems sho uld be so lved first through instituti o nal reform that insul ates the
audit from the negative impact o f rent -see kin g and so lves the adverse se lection
probl ems that otherwise im pair performance of the audit fun ct ion in the US.
SOA, with ilS blank chec k agency delegati on, merel y start s the reform process.
It does not take the concomitant and necessa ry ste p of reasse rting professional
standards. Broadb ru sh reformulation s of rul es-based GAAP should follow on ly
when institutional reforms have succeeded.
This Article' s subsequen t sections proceed as follows. Section 2 tra verses
the US reportin g cri sis, situating the ru les verSLI S principles de bate in the
conte xt o f rece nt audit fa ilures. The di sc ll ss ion shows tiwi the wave of audit
fai lures impli cates principl es-based GAAP much 11101'1: tha n it imp li cates rulesbased GAA P. A story ahout Enron Ill uch in L'i rclilation also is fa lsified.
According to the story, Enron exe lllpli fi es the :lbuses 0]" rul es-based accounting
under GAAP and demonstrates the 11 L'~ d (\lI1lIlVC III prin ciples. In reality, Enron
violated whatever accounting stand:lrd s got in its way, whet her structu red as
rul es or pri nci ples. Res pons ibility for lilt.:' di saster does not li e at the door of the
drafters of GAA P but at the doo r or those responsib le for implementation and
enforceme nt, Enron's managers and auditors. Section 3 explains why GAA P,
whi ch in fac t is founded on prin cipl es, ha s evo lved toward s art iculation in rules.
The respons ibilit y lies less wi th FASB, whi ch has bee n ope rat ing as a

" The effects of industry concentration are:'1 mallcr of debate. For the view th •.lI intense price
competition among audit firms has contributed to tow audit qU:l li ty. see te;l; ! accompanying n. 65

inJm.

14

William W. Bratton

EBOR 5 (2004)

responsive regul ator, than with its constituents. The constituents, the preparers
and auditors of financial statements, demand rules. Adverse selection problems
in their professional relationships motivate the demands. Section 4 compares
rules and principles in the second-best world of US audit practice. Rules hold
out cost savi ngs and can enhance tran sparency. Principles make things simpler
and enhance the comparability of fin ancial statements across different finn s.
The problem is that principles presuppose an independent auditor who holds
unmitigated professional power over the client and its treatment choices. In the
absence of such an actor, the case for a principles-based regime rests on a false
premise and holds out ri sks for audit quality. Section 5 concludes.

2.

RUL ES, PRINClPL ES, AND AUDIT FAILURE

Proponents of principles-based accounting blame audit failures and reporting
defalcations at firms like Enron and WorldCom on rules-based accounting and
look to principles-based reformulations as a corrective tool. The rules, they say,
are manipulated by managers, auditors, and consultants toward the end of
reporting mi sstatement. A principles-based system, such as presently in effect
in the United Kingdom and in IFRS, would be less manipulable and thus
superior. No one challen ges these assertions. But, as the discussion that fo llows
shows, the charges are in significant part unfounded. This is not because GAAP
contain s no manipul able rules, for it does. Nor is thi s because the rules have not
been manipulated, for they have been. It is because recent corporate scandal s
fo r the most pan do not stem from rule manipulation. There is no persuasive
causal connection between rule-based GAAP and recent, catastrophic audit
failures. Enron thought to be the prime case where corporate failure can be tied
to rule exploitation, turns out to be much more a case of human pathology than
of poor standard settin g.
t

2. 1 Standard setting and audit failure
According to the SEC's report under SOA on principles-based accounting,
rules-based standards are characteri zed by 'bright line tests, mUltiple exceptions, a high level of detail, and internal inconsistencies.' A rul es-based
approach, moreover, seeks to suppl y a clear answer to every poss ibl e situation,
thereby minimi zing the need to appl y professional judgment. 'h According to
GAAP's critics, thi s leads to transaction stru cturing and other strategic

I.

SEC Report. op. cit. n. 13, s. I.e.
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behav iour that unde rm ine s the qua lity of fina ncial repo rt ing. 'J Fina ncia ls thu s
ma ni pu lated, while rul e compliant, do not truly a nd fairl y slate th e reportin g
company ' s inco me and fin a nc ia l position. Comparability suffe rs as a resu lt;
Reponin g e ntiti es hewing to the sa me stri ct standa rd appear comparable on
fac es o f th eir fin ancia ls when their arrangement s in fact are di ssimilar. " Princ iples, say the c riti cs, avoid thi s reporti ng pathology and lead to higher quality
re porting; an e ffective system of accounti ng standard s must bui ld on principles
and cannot be constructed e ntire ly of rul es.
The c riti cs are ri ght th at e ffective accountin g sl;lIldards mu st have a basis in
princ ipl es. Unfortunatel y for the line of criti c ism. howcve r, GAAP exe mplifies
just such a system. GAAP is not co mprised so le ly of rules, althou gh some of its
direct ives are indeed set out in elaborately slaled ruk s rl'plL'lL' with bright- line
tes ts, Illultiple exceptions. and internal incoll sistl' llc il' s. Many GAAP standa rds
are pri nc ipl es- based. Furth ermore, <\ ("ol icc lillil Ill' hroad and powe rful princ iples stand s be hind the who le. I" FASB . upon ils illL'l.:pli on in 197 3, art ic ul a ted

" K. Schipper. ' Principles-Basell A~'CPlHlt jng Standards', 17 An:owllillg Hori:,()1/S (200 .1) p. 6 1.
I> Ibid .. p. 67.
'" These :lre. accordi ng tn ;1 k;ld ing legal accounting text. historic.1I cost. objectivity (or
verifiabili ty), revell ue recognition. m'ltching. consistenry. full di sdosure. :lIld relev:lI1L'e (or fnir
value). O.R. Herwitz and MJ . Barrt!lt, An'Ollllrillgfnr LlIIl"ye/".I': MlI/t' ria{.\·. 3'" edn. (New York.
Foundation 2002) PI'. 67-70. The Inst principle o n the list. rail' value. lately has been growing in
im porta nce al the t!xpensc of the fi rst two o n the list. historical cost and veri fin bility. See
generally Fitwncial Accou nti ng Standards Board. Prclilllillarr Vii'lt ·.'· Oil MojoI' /s.l"II('.\" Re/med /0
Reportillg Fill(///cia/ //l.I·/rlllllelll.\· (//1(1 C('J"will Rt"lmnf A.l"Sels (/Ild Liabili/ies (If Foil' Volue ( J 999):
S. SiegeL 'The Coming Revol ution ill A(xol1ntillg: The Emergence of Fair Val ue as the Fundamen tal Princ iple ofGAA P·. 42 WnY/l(.' L. R('I". ( 1996) p. 18.19. Tension resu lts - there is no way 10
have :r system requiring verifi nbl e numbers and nt the sa me time offe ring fair va lu e ligures. That
tension is being resolvcd in favour o f fa ir value as GAA P moves :lway rrolll a mandate that all
reported numbers be hard numbcrs toward a system including m;II1Y numhe rs that result from
judgment cnlls but that in theory o ffer n beller picture of the pro::sc nt v; lluc nf the linn . Note that
SO A s. J08(a) directs FAS B 10 prioritize the cOllsidcJ";lt i(ln nf Il CW ru les rdlccting 'emerg ing
accounting principles and chang ing business praclices.' Thi s pn,:sllllwbly mean s more movement
\0 fair va lue t reatme nt .~ . T he Congress overlooks the fact thaI the same movement certainl y
played a role in the accounti ng mess at Enron. where n';lr~ It I mar~et and f<li l" v.tlue 'lCl'ollllting or
its derivative and energy contr'll'ts contributed mi gh tily III .\l l ~(lil· i (lns 'lbuu t ils e:trn ings fig ul"es.
See F. PartnllY. 71:.\"1;1111111.1' 8<:/111"(' 111(' Set/ale (',1/I/llIil1l ' I' (II/ Cm'cn/lllellTaI AJJi lirs {SS RN
working paper IIA R ev i .~ i o n i .~1 View of EnrOll amI the Sudtkn Deal h of " May". available al
<htl p:llpapc rs.ssm.colll/soi.1/papers.cfm?absl r;ll·l_ id;:::-I I 726 I > (lasl visited 26 Janu<lry 20(4) II.
COlllmo n sense indic:Hes that we should read.iu'it Ihe balance in favour or verifi abi lit y. at least
until the crisis has passed.
Other tcnsio ns come into the pi r ture whcn In' i"cl"crence two modifying l'Ol1ventions-ma teri:tlity. which lets the audi tor disregard minnr mi s' lpplications of the rules. and conservati sm,
whic h coun se ls underslatement ill l'nse of dOllbt. Between hi ~lo r ic:l 1 cost. verilinhility. and
I.:onscrvatislll 0 11 the Olle IMnd , ,md fair va lue alld nlllteriality o n the other. there is mllc h roo m for
good faith dispute ,tbout the best w~ly Itl :-:late.1 firm's res ults.
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GAAP's basic principles in a series of Concepts Statements,2/) collectively
called the conceptual framework. This has ever since been the source of the
objectives and concepts drawn on in the development of US accounting
21
standards. The overarching concept in the conceptual framework is 'decision
usefulness'. It is in turn supported by the trio of relevance, reliability, and
comparability.~2 Decision usefulness is achieved in the first instance through
comparability. That is, similar transactions and conditions should be reported
the same way by different ftnns and by each frnn across time. The achievement
of comparability in turn necessitates standard setting. Relevance and reliability
come into the framework at this point to assist the standard setter in articulating
requirements for recognition of income, measurement of assets and liabilities,
and disclosure more generalIy.~J As articulated within the conceptual
framework, GAAP is explicitly principles-based, even as it contains many
rules.
A critic might respond that other accounting systems manage to do as good a
job as does US GAAP with materially greater reliance on principles than on
rules. The UK regime often is held out at this point. As to auditing standards, the
UK system does appear to be more principles-based than those in the US. 24 But
the picmre is less clear with respect to the UK's substantive accounting principles. British accounting rests on eight Financial Reporting Standards, twentyfive Statements of Standard Accounting Practice, plus a thick supplementary
literature. Much of this is as dense and rule-bound as US GAAP.2~ The same is
2b
true of lFRS. One commentator, reviewing a number of systems for relative
rule-based complexity, including those of the US, the UK and IFRS, found no
obvious reason to distinguish US GAAP as a pathological outlier. 27 All
accounting systems mix rules and principles.
More importantly. there is no clear causal connection between rules-based
US GAAP and recent high-profile reporting failures. Those who denounce
GAAP for excessive reliance on rules cite a number of subject matters. These

:ru For FASS's discussion of these in the context of the principles based accounting movement
of 2002, see FASS. Principles-Based Approach to u.s. Standard Setting, No. 1125-001 (2 1
October 2(02) pp. 5-7 [hereafter cited as FASS. Principles Approachl .
~I See FASS. Staremelll of Financial Accounting Concepts No.1, Objective of Financial
Reporting by Business Enterpri.ses (November 1978).
:: See FASS, Statement of Financial Accollnting Concepts No.2, Qualitative Characteristics
of Accounting lnformation (1980) .
:J Schipper, loc. cit. n 17, pp. 62-63.
:'.' See c.A. Frost and K.P. Ramin. 'International Accounting Differences ', 18 1 J. Acct.
(1996) p. 62.
!.' L.W. Cunningham, 'The Sarbanes·Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Refonn (And It
Just Might Work)" 35 Conn. L Rev. (2003) pp. 9 15, 975-76.
!,. See SEC Report, op. cit n. 13. s. l.F.
~J Cunningham, loc. cit. n. 25, p. 976 n. 291.
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core, rul es-based regimes incl ude accou nting for derivati ves and hedging
activity, leasing, real estate sales, stock-based compensation arrangements,
co nsoli dat ion (or other recogniti on) of related entity financ ial assets and li abi li ties, and , prior 10 reforms instituted in 200Z/ x mergers and acqui siti ons ..!'! The
Ge neral Accou nting Office's (GAO) recent report of public company
accounting restatements permits us 10 gauge the ex tent 10 which these rulesbased subject matt er figures into the spate of accountin g failures. Since
accou ntin g restatements pres uppose audi t failure, the GAO's compendi um
provides a road map to accounting's ab used territories.
The GAO report shows that the an nu al numher of restatements rose from 92
in 1997 to 225 in 200 I. From 1997 10 Jun e 2002. the total number of restatements an nounced was 919 :~1 These invo lved X45 companies, amounting len per
ce nt of all those li sted on pub li c exc hanges ill the US. Iss ues involving revenue
recogniti on, whether in respect of mi sreported or nunreported revenue, made up
the larges t group by subject matter category. accounting for almost 38 per cent
of the 9 19 restatement s:" The second largest group con cerned cos t or expense·
related iss ues, accoun ting for almost 16 pCI' n: nt . ,. ThL' GAA P revenue and cost
recogniti on standards bearing on thi s S4 per CL' lli majorit y group are for the
mos t part principl es-based - they are phrased in ~e l1 e r; i1 term s and require
signirica rll exercises of judgment in the ir ;lppl ica t i(lll . " WoridCom is the most
famous recent case of these principks' opportunistic mi sll se . Ove r three yea rs
WorldCom shifted around $8 hill ion or lillL' L'U stS (lver to ;ISSct accoun ts.
treating operatin g expenditures as capital ex p~ nditure s, with earnings for the
peri od of the shift increas ing dolla r for dol lar. This age-o ld ru se fo r paddin g
earnin gs impli cated neither hi gh·tech eng ineerin g nor manipulati on of compl ex
rul es. '-I It was a bad fai th appl icati on of a principle.
T he rema ining restatements cover a ran ge of subj ect matter, some of it rul es·
based, but most of it principl es- based. On the rul es-based side are restatement s

~ See FAS S . Sralemellf of Filu/ltc:ia/ ACCOI"'lillg S/(mdards No. 141, BIf.~·illes.\· CO/llhillllfioll.\·

(J une 200 I) (ending pooling treatment for mergers) .
.'" SEC Report. op. cit. n. t3. S5 . I. G. II.B .
•, GAO Rep(JI"I , op. cil. 11 4.

" Ibi d.
.': Ibid. These types of restatemcnts include instances of improper cost recogn ition. tax issues.
and olher cO~Hel<lled improprieties that led to rinancialmisstateme nls .
.1l Herwitz & Bao·ctt. op. cil. n. 19. pp. 449-462. 474-482. The generat principl es are supple·
menlcd by industry specific ru les. The door for Ihi s supplementat ion is opened by FASB
Concepts Statement No.5. which bases the revenue recognition standards on thccJosing practices
of its time. But il provides lillte further conce pl ual basis. FASB has a current project that looks
toward a conceptual restatement. See Schipper. lac. cit. n 17. p. 63 .
.\J For description of this fraud . see Clinn ingham. op. cit. n. 25. pp. 934·36.
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concern ing merger and acquisition accounting and derivatives:\~ More on the
principles~based side li e restatements involving in-process research and development, related-party transactions, loan -loss reserves and loan write-afts, asset
impairment, inventory valu ation, and restructuring activity. Jt,
There is a si mple reason why rul es-based subject matters do not dominate the
list of restatements: Detailed rules hold out roadm aps both to GAAP compli ance and the identification of GAAP noncompliance. Observers who disapprove of the rules-based treatmentsJ7 dislike the reporting destinations to which
the roadrnaps lead. Since these destinations tend simultan eously to be favoured
by the managers of reporting companies, the managers happily comply with the
rules. At the same time, a noncomplying issuer is more likely to confront an
uncooperative auditor. Detailed rules hold out the benefit of enhancin g transparency even as they can distort the overall story told by the report's bottom
line. They make it easier to see what compani es are doing, if only for the reason
that the precise instructions narrow the room for differences of judgment. J~
Rules also ease verification. Detailed instructions provide a base of common
assumptions and knowledge for both preparers and aud itors. Differences in
measurement decrease as a resu lt. Noncompliance becomes more ev ident. oW
And the auditor who di scovers noncompliance is more likely to refuse to let it
pass given a rule. The rule provides it a clear-c ut basis for justifying the refusal
to the client, minimizi ng potential damage to the professional relationship.
Si nce the rule makes noncompliance more visible, it al so increases the risk of ex
post enforce ment respecting the preparer and the auditor both, further
strengthening the auditor's resolve.

" GAO Report. toc. cit. n. 4. Derivatives are a growth item on the list of restatements. Along
with other securities-related restatements. they increased from 4.6 per cent of restatements in
2001 to 12.4 per cent of restatements in the first half of 2002. Butlhe category is capacious. and
includes errors and misstatements involving derivatives. warrants, stock options. and other
convertible securities. Some of the standards in question are rules-based, while others are
standards-based. Significantly, most involve fair value accounting .
... Ibid.
,\7 See M.W. Nelson, J.A. Ellion, and R.L. Tarpley, 'Where Do Companies Atte mpt Earnings
Management, and When Do Auditors Prevent It ?' This working paper is available at <http://
papers.ssrn.comlsoI3/papers.cfm?abstrac1_id=248 129> (last visited 26 January 2004) (showing
that auditors pass on these treatments as GAAP compliant) .
." As noted above, 10 the extent the rule strategic transaction design, comparability may be
losl as dissimilar transactions receive common treatment. Schipper, loc. cit. n. 17, pp. 67-68 .
.. See ibid., p. 68.
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Those who asc ribe rules- based standards with a causal role in the accounting
cri sis point to Enran. At first g lance the citati on appears justifi ed . Mi sleading
accounting treat men ts of transaction s between Enron and off-ba lance sheet
entiti es lie at the scandal' s core, and the applicable accountin g standards are
rules-based. Indeed, these rules' form over substance treatments are as notori ous ly arbitrary as any in US GAAP.
C riti cism of these rules has been widespread for decades. Eve n FASB
consistently has joined the criti cs. For two decade s pri or to 2001 it kept open a
project inquiring into an alternative approac h bui lt on a prin ciples-based defini ti on of co ntrol..lO' Unfort un ately for FASB, the business comm unity, particularly
the securiti za tion industry, had come to rely on it s ll1astery and manipulat ion of
these rule s, especiall y the labyrinthin e se t on tran sfers to off-ba lance sheet
entiti es. The industry interests vociferously opposed reform . Exhaus ted by the
oppos iti on, FASB abandoned the project of SUDst;IIlI ivc re statement as a failure
even as the Emon sca ndal was breaking. Laler. in the wake o f the scandal ,
FASB' s criti cs did an abollt face, sudden ly demandin g pri Ilciples-based reform.
FASB responded by reviving the re forl11 proj ec t. and has since produced a
success ion of Enron-responsive ex posure draft s. " FASB 's rev ived reform
project amounts to a tacit admission of sta nd ard sell ing failure. For all that
appears, eve n the body respons ihl e for GAAP ag rees that its rules had a
causative role in the co mpany's collapse.
1n ac tin g ou t the ro le of a defi cie nt lawmaker, FASB confirms the conventiona l wisdom circulating in the wake of Enron 's co ll apse. This story fo ll ows
from the assumption that a di sas ter of th is magnitude never could have occurred
had th ere not been a !law in the rules. The story has it that Enron ex pl oi ted
tec hnica l rul es govellling Special Purpose Entit ies (SPE) in setting up and
accounting for sham tran sactions . By carefull y but cyni call y hewing to the
rul es, Enron managed material ly to overstate its earnin gs. Had the rules been
beller drafted, Enron wou ld have bee n fo rced to consolidate the results of the

~, Sec FASB. C(JII.l'Olhlllled Fil1lll/cial SlaTemenls: Pili/illSI' (ll1d Policy (proposed 23
Febru ary (999).
" FAS B. COlI.wlilJali(J/1 (!f Cerlain S{}(!ciol PJlI'po.I'£' Elllilic.~ - (III IlIIerpl'eWliol/ (jARB N(J.
5 J (proposed I July 20(2). Thi s dran deals wifh SPEs and wou ld have caused the consolidation of
Enron' s LJM I and 2. It also increases the outside eq uit y requirement 10 ten per cenl for a residual
class of SPEs Ihal would hnve included those in question . A second init intive addresses disclosures of guara nt ee~. on the purport that the present rules lad clarity. FASB.II1IClpr/!wlioll No. 45.
GI/ammur·.\' An'uulllillg Oisdosure Reqllir('II/(,lIls.frw Glll/ rall/ees. Im:llldillg III(lirel.·/ Gmlrt/IIlees of 'lldeblellileH orOlhers (25 November 2(02).
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sham SPE:;: wit h its ow n results. Consolidation in turn would have deprived
Enron of the opportunity to mi sstate its earnings. ~1
Generali zing from the story, rules-based GAAP's layers of precise instruction s easily can be manipulated by clever and ex pensive accountants and
lawyers. Had GAAP taken a principles- based approach, articul atin g general
and substantive standard s respecting the consolidation of related en tities, there
would have been no loophole through whi ch the bad actors at Enron could have
dri ve n their fl eet of sham SPE truck s.
The story is accurate in one respect: the rul es respecting accounting for tran sactions wi th SPEs we re badly drafted and incomplete. But in all other respects
the story is nonsense. Enron, in fact, did not follow the rul es, Had it done so, the
substance of all of its questionable dealings with SPEs would have been
di sclosed in its financial statements. It follows that the rules did not fail. The
failure lay with aCLOrs at Enron and its auditor, Arthur Anderson, Fail ures at
FASB played no role. FASB's implic it, after the fact, admi ssion of a rul e fai lure
te lls us more about its weak ness as a political player than it does about the
operation of GAAP.~.1
It is true that the SPE tran sactions at the heart of the Enron scandal emerged
from an exhausti ve and strategic planning process. It also is true that the tran sactions were designed to comply with the rules even as they exploited the rul es'
structural weak nesses. Under SFAS No. 140, issued in 2000, transfers of
fina ncial assets to SPEs are treated as sales by the transferor finn so lon g as,
among ot her thin gs, eq uity interests in the SPE are nOi return ed as consideration
for the assets transferred and the SPE gets control of the assets with the ri ght 10
pledge or exc hange them ..I.I For the class of SPEs utili zed in the Enron tran sacti ons, all the planner had to do was make sure that an outside equity in vestor in
the SPE vehicl e contributed capital at least equalLO three percent of the va lue of
the financial assets transferred to the SPE vehi cle by Enron.
It al so is true that at the time Enron set up the critical 'UM I' and 'LJM ll '
SPEs and entered into swap tran saction s with them , the tran saction s arguably

,~ One fi nds this story casua ll y mentioned as accepted wisdom in the pages of the New York
Tillle.l· at the end of 2002. See K. Eichenwald. 'A Higher Standard for Corporate Advice' , NY.
'l'illl£,.\' (23 December 2002) pp. A I, A 20 (quoting Professor Frank Part noy as follow s: 'Enron was
lill lowing the letter of the law in nearly all of its deals. It is fair to say that Ihe mOSI seriOliS allegations or criminal wrongdoi ng al Enron had almost nOlhing to do wi th the company's collapse.
Illslt!;ld it was the type of transaction that is still legal. ') .
Significantl y, reporting companies and the big accounti ng firm s (notably incl uding
'\Illli.:rsell and Enron , see G.R. Simpson, ' Dea ls That Took Enron Under Had Many Supporte rs',
111<11/ SI . .I. (10 April 2002) pp. A I. A I 3), vigorously opposed FAS B's consolidat ion project, criti,'l/ lIlg lilt! FASB's draft as unworkable. S. Burkholder, 'Accounting: Outl ook 2002' ,34 Sec. Reg.
,~ '- /<" (1. (2002) pp. 2 14, 215.
" Fi\SB . SIIIIIIIIGI)' of SWlemel/1 No. }40. ACCOlllllil1g for Trallsfe rs a/ld Sen'icillg of
/111,1111 illl ;h .\'('I.\· IIlId Erlillguislimems of Liabililie.\· (Septe mber 2000).
I '
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complied with the rul es. But, as subsequent investi gati ons have detail ed at
length , the tran sacti on stru ctures had intrinsic Oaws and went o ut of compliance
with the three per ce nt rul e very soon after the transact ion s closed ..!.' Had Enron
scrupulous ly followed the rules at that point. it wou ld have been forced to
conso lid ate the SPEs int o its finan cials. Had the SPEs been conso lidated, the
outco mes of the swap tran sac tion s betwee n EnrOll and the SPEs wou ld have
bee n elimin ated from Enron's income stateme nt with the res ult that Enron
woul d not have been able to pump Li p its net earnings with re venues and gains
fro m SPE transactions. But, of co urse, th e finallcia ls were not consolid ated and
EnrOll overstated its earnings by $ 1 bi llio n over fi ve quarters. But the noncompli ance did not result froJ11the successful manipul at ion of flawed rul es. In stead,
like Parmalat's managers on the other side of the At lan ti c, Enron's managers
resorted to the old fas hio ned expedi ent of concea lmen t.
EnrOll 's Iln ancia ls wo uld have bee n out of comp li ance with GAAP eve n if
the finan cia ls' treat ment of its swaps with LJM had conformed to th e rul es on
co nso li dat ion of finan cia ls. Consol idation was not the only compli ance
problem impli cated by the LJM transacti on st ructure. Under SFAS No. 57,
co ntracts between Enroll and the LJM SPEs were ' related party transactions'.
T hi s category incl udes tran sac ti ons with a counterpart y whose po licies are so
in lluenced by the fi rst pa rty as to prevent one of th e parties from full y pu rsuing
its own interes ts. G iven such a tie, spec ial foo tn ote descriptions of th e tran sactions are required. includin g doll ar amount impacts on re ported earnings. The
footn ote di sclosures would have provided in vestors with the substantive eq ui valent of a set o f conso li dated re ports. Bu t, of course, Enron did not wish to make
clear th e truth respect in g thi s compo nent of its re ported ea rnings, and its cooperative audilor fail ed to insist th at it fo llow the rul es on related party
transactions .
An add it ional repo rtin g failure fi gured prominently in Enron's fin al
col lapse. The stra w that bro ke the camel's back, fru strated a last-d itch resc ue
plan, and fo rced th e compa ny to Il le for bankruptcy in Dece mher 200 I was
Enron 's the last minute re ve lat ion of $4 billion of unre p0 ri l:'d cc ntin gent guarantees of ob ligations of unconsol idated equ il Y affi liatcs. The revd ~J ti o n kill ed a
bail outmcrge r with Dynegy beca use the hi dden $4 hillion o f o bli gation s materiall y impaired E nrOll 'S fin ancial cond ition and Wl'l'L' "hOlltt o come du e ..n As to
these obli ga tion s GAA P ho ld s oul a cil:;lr inslrw..:lion. To guarantee an eq uity
affi li ate's ob ligations is to take thL' disclosurL' IrL';lI ment out of the pare nt subsidiary or parent- in vestee co nt(:x t I'm tr(: ;ll rnL'llt und er th e standard s on
Jh

" W.e. Powers. Jr.. et al .. 'Report of l nve~li~ali~)I] hy the Special In vestigative Comm ittee of
the Board of Directors of Enron Corp.' aV<1il::lbk al 2()02 WL 19S0 IS (2002) p. 9S.
". FASB. SllI l l'lIIelll No. 57. Re/ufed Pllrry /)i.\'I'iO.l'IIfl'.I", paras. 2. 24(1') (March (982).
" Bra((o n.loc cit. n. 2. Pl'. 1320-1.125.
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contingent losses. Those standards call for di sclosure. Under SFAS No.5, loss
contingencies are divided into three classes: probable, reasonably possible, and
remote. Probable losses should be accrued as liabilities; reasonably possible
losses should be di sclosed in footnotes with infonnation as to nature and
magnitude; remote losses need not be disclosed. There is a separate rule for
financial guarantees such as Enron's. With guarantees, even if the possibility of
loss is remote , there mu st be footnote disclosure as to nature and arnount.~~
Enron failed to make those di sc losures because it was afraid that di sclosure
could trigger a rating agency downgrade to below investment grade status.
(Enron needed an investment grade rating to run its trading business and did
everything it could to maintain one). This included material understatement of
its obligations as guarantor. This amounts to another old-fashioned fraud by
co ncealment. It comes as no surprise that, thu s stated, Eoron 's financials did not
comply with GAAP."
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, then, the central problem at Eoron lay
not with the rules themselves but with the company's failure to follow them.
The Enron disaster stemmed not from the rules' structural shortcomings but
from the corruption of Enron's man agers and perverse financial incentives that
inclined its auditor towards cooperation.
The conventional wisdom errs in a second respect as well. The story blames
the complex rules on accounting for SPE transaction s. It asserts that had FASB
adopted a principles-based approach to consolidation of related entity financial
statements, Eoron would have been di sabled from perpetrating its fraud. Unfortunately for the story, the complex rules governing SPEs in SFAS No. 140
applied in full only to mainstream transactions, like the securitization of pools
of mortgages. Enron's SPE transactions did not flow in the mainstream
governed by SFAS No. 140. They instead fell into a category of 'other' SPE

,. See FASB, Statemellf of Financial Accollllfing SflIndar(/s No.5, Accoulllin8 for COllfingencies (March 1975) para. 5: 'The Board concludes that disclosure of [guarantees of indebtedness of
others and others that in substance have the same characteristic] shall be continued. The disclosure shall include the nature and amount of the guarantee.' See also FASB, Interpretation No. 34,
Disclosure of In direct Guarantees of IlIdebledne.5S of Others (March 1981): Herwitz & Barrett.
op. cit. n. 19, pp. 617-20. Note that under SFAS No. 140, a separate recourse obligation against
the transferor of an asset to an SPE in respect of reimbursement for losses on the underlying
ponfo1io (as opposed to a derivative arrangement) continues 10 be treated under SFAS No.5. ThaI
is, Ihe transferor makes an ongoing assessment of the amount of the loss in its financials rather
than adjusting the obligation to fair value and reponi ng it in income. Ernst & Young, Financial
Reporli/lg Developments; AccOImlillgfor Transfers and Servicing of Fillancial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities - FASB Stalement 140 (May 2001) p. 29.
"" And therefore were per se misleading for securities law purposes. See 'Administrati ve
Policy on Financial Statements, Accounting Series ReI. No.4', 11 Fed. Reg. 10,913 (S.E.c.
1938). codified in ·Codification of Financial Reporting Policies, s. 101 ', reprinted in 7 CCH Fed.
Sec. L Rep. para . 72,921 (18 May 1988).
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transac ti ons not covered in their en tirety by FASB standard- setting, For tran sac tions in the residua l category, the criti ca l requirement was a minimum ou tside
equity inves tmen t. As to thi s the acco unt ing firm s used a three pe r cent rul e of
thumb , derived from a 199 1 letter of th e Ch ief Accountant of th e SEC issued in
respect of a lease tran saction ,''''' To read the 199 1 letter is to see that the SEC
required three per ce nt outs ide equ ity fundi ng on the facts or the leas in g case
presented to it. The agency never intended to set three per cent as a one-sizefit s-a ll, bri ght line test. During the I990s, the SEC repeatedl y poi nted ou t to the
accounting profession that no three per cen t bri ght line lest ex isted and that the
level of outside equity fu nding for a qua lifyi ng SPE in the residu al category
should fo ll ow from the nature of the tran saction, In the SEC's view, the
question was whether, on the facts of th e case, sufficient Olllside equity cap ital
had been in ves ted to assu re the SPEs independence. " The outside equity
requirement was rhus inte nded not as a rule hu t as a tlexible prin ciple to be
appli ed in the circum stances. But, th.::s pitc the age ncy's jawboning. the
acco unting profess ion app lied the prirlL'ipk as a th rce per cent brigh t line rul e.
That rul e-based th ree per cent was the ope ratiw ass umpti on when Enron
planned the LJM transactions.
A di sturbing pattern of com lllunica ti ve breakdown and noncompliance
emerges. A standard-setting age ncy articulat es a prin cip le and tell s US <l uditors
to app ly it as such, The auditors instead bowdlerize the standard so that it
operates as a check-the-box rule. At the leve l of practice, then , US audi tors
manufacture rul es whe re rules do not ex ist. A number o r quest ions fol low . Why
do US aud itors di splay a refractory preference for rul es? What preven ts audi tors
from applying standards as intended? Will the behaviour patlern persist under
the new pri nciples-based reg ime projected by GAAP reformers? Responses to
these ques tions follow in sec ti ons 3 and 4,

2.3

Summary

GAAP' s fo rm and content do need im provement and take so me of the blame fo r
the US accountin g cri sis. There ca n be no denyin g that prac titi oners often take
advantage of GAAP's rul e structures when they design aggressive treatments.
Regulatory arbit rage - the practice or stru ct urin g an inappropri ate tran sac ti on

q, The GAA P authorities arc EITF Topic

D- 14. 'Transactions involving Spec ial Purpose
EITF 90- 1S, ' Impact of Nonsubstantive Lessors. Residual Value Guarantees and Other
Provisions in Leasing Transaclions' , and EtTF 96-21. ' Implement ation Issues in Accouming for
I.casing Tran sactions involvi ng Special Purpose Entities '.
" See OJ . Ragone III. 'Current Accounting Projects'. 2000 Con/en'lIce 01/ SEC Del't!lol"
1111'111,\· (4 December 2000),
1 ~ llliti es·.
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so it stays just within the bounds set by a rule~2 - c learl y is widespread. But these
rule-based aggressive treatments, which tend to in vo lve structured fin ance,
leases, a nd (until recently) pooled me rgers, do not show up in large numbers on
the list of recent restatements. The reason is th at the rul es make the treatments
GAAP-compliant, even as many observers di sapprove of the treatments.
The audi t failures and restatements fo llow less from regul atory arbitrage
than from strategic noncompli ance - acti on unde r an inte rpretation of the law in
conflict with Lhe stated interpretation of the regul ator.n Neither rules nor
standards prevent such conduct, and , as between the two, rules have the
advantage in deterring it. Meanwhile, in every case of a restatement, GAAP by
definition has proved adequate to the job of identi fy ing the mi sstatement and
providing corrective instructions. Under thi s analysis, the drafters of SOA were
ri ght in thinking that the absence of principles has contributed {Q the cri sis but
wrong in diagnosing the problem as legislati ve. This is not for the most part a
prob lem concerning the relati ve merits of rules and principles in standard
setting. It is instead a problem of professional practi ce in a regulatory system
made up of both. It is the auditors who need to gel back to principles, taking
seriously principles already governing the reporting system.

3.

TH E DEM AN D FOR RULES

We have seen that US GAAP literally foll ows from general principles. Yet it
has become more and more rul es-based as articulated over time. This is not
because its general principles no longer moti vate parti cul ar GAAP standards,
but because US accountin g's constituents constantl y and effectively register
demands for tail ored treatments. The propensity {Qward rul es follows from a
supply and demand dynamic between the standard-setter, FASB, the audit
finns, and their managemem clients.
The demand for rules fo llows from auditin g clients' constant des ire for
exception fro m rul es. When an accounting princi ple articulates a treaUTIent
category and a set of reporting companies di slike the way the LreaUTIent applies
[Q them , they (and th eir auditors) lobby for an exception. One means to the end
ofpennitted dev iati on from the mandated treatment is a 'scope exception' - a
rule that rule excludes stated transacti ons or items.SoI GAAP 's complex derivati ve rul es prov ide a good example, with their nin e exceptions to the definition of
derivati ve, several of which carne into the rules solely for the purpose of

l~ See T. F. Malloy, ·Regulation and the Compliance Nonn' , UCLA Law School worki ng
paper, 2003 (on file with aUlhor).
'.' Ibid .
.w Schipper. lococi t. n. 17, pp. 66-67.
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redu cing preparation cost s.~·\ Altern ati vely, constituents request and anain
' trea tment exceptions' - spec ial rul es for defin ed items or industry practi ces.
Rules faci li tatin g inco me smoothin g provide a prominent exa mpl e:'" Hav in g
won thei r rule-based exceptions, the co nstitu ents then request detail ed instructi o ns res pec ting impl ementation .-'1 FAS B respo nd s, and GAA P becomes still
more compl ex.

3. 1 FASB: the responsive standard setter
G AA P has ve ry close formati ve ties to the profess ion th aI applies it, ties cl oser
eve n th an those between US legisl atures and judges and the lega l professionals
who adv ise corporate c li ents. Gove rnment mand ates di ctate much of th e advice
lawyers give to cli ent s. But the gove rnment , although heavil y popul ated with
lawyers, operates at arm 's length from the legal profess ion. Acco untin g, in
co ntras t, operates like a guild both at the leg islati ve and at the profess ional
leve l. A uditors appl y law generated within their own profession, operatin g at
cl oser quarters with the pertin ent law making in stituti ons than do lawyers.
The governance structure of FAS B de monstrates thi s prox imity. At first
g lance it appears designed to preve nt the large auditin g firms from dominating
the body that makes GAAP. Publi c accountant s may fill no more than three of
FASB 's seven seats, with the remainin g fo ur seats bein g taken by two corporate
exec uti ves , one fin ancia l anal yst, and one academi c.-~ On further co ns ideration,
however, th e four to three split does not prov id e a credibl e guarantee aga inst
spec ial interest influ ence. Auditors and corporate audit cl ients will have a
co mmunity of inlerest on most ho t button stand ard setting issues. FAS B, by
co uplin g three auditors with two corporate exec uti ves, ass ures that thi s
communit y of interest has a fi ve-to-two votin g advantage. FAS B also is il ve ry
small shop, with a staff of onl y forty- fi ve. For fundin g, it has hi stori call y reli ed
on the charitable support of the large audit firm s, along with a tri ckl e of
reve nues fro m publi cati on sal es. ~'J Add all of thi s up, and the stru cture does not
guarantee robust institu tional ind ependence for G AA P's standard se tter.
With th is incent ive proble m in mind , let us rev isit FAS B' s wi thdrawa l orits
two decades old project loo kin g tow ard a suhSl<lncL'-ovc r-form approach to

" Ibid. p. 66 .
.., Ibid .
'I Ibid. p. 67.
" Herwilz & Barren. op. cit. n. 19. PI' 154- J 56 .
... [bid .. p. 54. Meanwhi le. the Emergi ng IsSUI!S Task Force. which since 1984 has had the job
of pronouncing on culting-edge requests for :Iuv ice on appropriate treatrnerus. is a group
populated almost entirely of representat ives or the large fir ms. [bid. p. 157.
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defi ning control and imposing consolidation. foe ) Why did FASB give up? It
seems unlikely that the decision followed from ajuri sprudenti al commitment to
rules-based accountin g. More likely FASB abandoned the project because it
expected a shift to a standard to trigger voc iferous oppositi on from reporting
compani es and the large audit firms because it would have had a restraining
effect on the structured fin ance. Securitization is a billion dollar industry.
Auditing firms participate as consultants. Reporting companies securi tize their
assets to enh ance their bottom lines. Market intermediaries draw enomlOUS
revenues from making the deals. To the ex tent that a new consolidation regime
would have chilled deals by changing accounting treatments, all of these actors
would have gone straight to the barricades to protect the status quo. FASB , after
years of being greeted with threats from lobbyists and attack dog congressmen
whenever it tried to improve anything, was entitled to be a little gun shy in the
face of strong demand for the statu s quo respecting consolidation.
It should be noted that corporate managers do not have the power simpl y to
dictate GAAP's terms. GAAP rule- makings are much contested , despite
FASS's structural weakness and man agement's capture of the auditor interest.
Indeed, FASB has cond ucted itse lf with admirable independence in recent
years, taking positions opposed to those of management and the audit profession on key issues like the treatment good will arising in mergers and manageM
ment stock opti ons. Sut FASS ' s structural weakness does bear on the rules
versus principles choice in day-to-day standard setting. When empowered
cons tituents present FASB with a standard-setting problem or pose a question
about a proposed standard , in either case asking for a solution in the form of a
scope or treatment exception, they often get a sympathetic heari ng.
US GAAP accordin gly presents a cogni sab le capture problem. GAAP in
many respects result s from an internal conversation, wi th no institutio nal
mechani sm assuring that the public interest trumps the interests of audit firms
and their clients in its promulgation. Asymmetries of information and methodological wherewithal aggravate the problem. GAAP is a body of law structurally shi elded from outside inspecti on. Monitoring GAAP is difficult - to know
what is go ing on respecting substantive iss ues in accounting is to be a member
of the guild in the firs t place.
Solidarity within the accounting profession aggravates the problem . This
profession closes ranks when a maj or conflict breaks out between it and the rest
of the economy. Among the multitude of talking heads from the business world
that provided the US medi a wi th its sound bites during recent corporate cri ses,
none were partners from the large auditing firms. Even as the rough and tumble

.., See SI/pra n. 40 and accompanying lext.
A. Levitt, Take On the Street: What Wall Street and Corporate America Don't \Yam
K,wI<.'. What You Can Do /0 Fight Back (New York: Ra ndom House 2002) pp. 106- 11 5.
nl
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world of public policy di sc ussion suddenl y occ upi ed itself with GAAP and the
audit profession, the audit firms stayed s il ent./'~ The silence hardly stemmed
from di sinterest. It instead served to preserve information asymmetry - the less
said about audit practi ce outside the profess ion the better. Industry concentrati o n augments accounting 's professiona l so lidarity. There remain onl y four
firm s left with the wherewithal to conduct audits of large capitalization
companies. In a uni verse of four organizations, di scipline is easil y maintained.
The legal profess ion in the US , with all its fault s, displays no comparable
solidarity. For every lawye r who closes ranks wi th a corporate client, th ere is
another lawyer looking to bring suit against that first lawyer' s c1ie m, or, altern ati ve ly, to get the leg islature to authorize a lawsuit. When the corporation' s
lawyer goes to Capi tol Hill to ge t the client protecti ve leg islati on, the tri al
lawyers also are there, workin g the othe r side. When lawyers advocate for their
cl ients in public, they are understood (0 be acting in a special role. Any representati ons they make on clients' behalf concerning the state of the law are
greeted with scepticism. Indeed, critique usuall y is assured , for a second lawyer
wi ll be charged with arti cul ating the opposi ng view.
Accou ntant s operate differeml y as a profess ion; even as they ha ve come
more and more resembl e lawyers in playi ng an advocacy role for their clients.
Where with lawyers the advocacy appears in briefs and memoranda of law, with
accounting the advocacy merges into the numbers reported on the clients'
certifi ed financials. Readers of fin anci al report s have not been on notice to
bring sceptici sm to bear, at least until very rece ntl y. And th ose who do proceed
cautiously get o nl y indirec t mean s with in the repofts' four com ers with whi ch
to sort numbers influenced by advocacy fro m harder numbers unjnfluenced by
management' s agenda. This does not go to say that finan cial reports always are
ta ken at face va lue. In theory , Wall Street's fin anc ial anal ys ts pla y the criti cal
fun cti on. Unfortu nately, in recem prac ti ce they too have lacked the incentive to
criticize./'\ Nor can we ass ume that a vigo rous critiqu e will eman ate from within
the account ing profess ion, for it has no segme nt with a financial stake in arti cu·
lalin g adversary positi ons. The entire burden of critique and con'eclion has
devo lved on FASB , the SEC accou ntin g office/'"' and a handful of academi cs.

"" We must put to one side Arthur Andersen's Joe Berardi no. who publ ic ly and unsuccessfully acted OLit the role of the CEO trying to quell an organizational conflagrat ion .
.., The incentive problem stems from undelwriting and o ther rent streams nowing from the issuers
of financ ial repons to the employers of analysts. It is nO{ clear that the problem admits of an easy
solution. Absent lhal comlpling rent now. it is not d ear that resources exist to support an adequate
llow of critical analysis. Restating the point. reform implies a new plicillg stmclUre for the audit.
,,' The SEC had the power 10 impose accou nting rules prior to SOA. See 15 U.S .c. ss. 77(a),
7Hrn(b)( I) ( 1994). The SEC exercises ils power o nly rarely. prefenillg 10 leave the job to FASB.
:ll"! ing. under Ihe threal of intervent ion should the SEC's preferences nOI be satis ried. Herwi tz &
Barrett. op. cit. 11 . 19. p. t46.
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Audit Firm Demands

Auditors are inclined toward cooperatio n with their cl ients and will tend to
support their clients' reporting objecti ves. Competiti on for consulting business
aggravates the inclinati on. Auditors also are di sincl ined to say no to their
clients. Jt foll ows that before so doing they will seek the backing of a precise
negati ve instructi on in GAAP. The rul e denudes the negati ve response to the
client of any suggesti on that the nay-say ing stems from the auditor 's own
pro fess ional judgment. The ex tern al authority takes the bl ame. Un der the
prev ailing relational pattern , audit cl ients balk at negati ve auditor demands
absent a prec ise writtenjuslifi cati on: 'S how me where it says I can ' t do th is." '\
This profess ional dynami c ge nerates a hi gh dema nd for rul es.
The profession's fear of enforcement entang lement strengthens th e preference. Wi th an open-ended principl e, both the preparer and the auditor make a
judgment respecting a law to fact app licati on. Ris k averse actors in thi s posture
will be wary of second-guessin g by regul atory authorities."" They fear that the
good faith they bring to the principle 's application will be unverifiabl e expos,.
Principles, then, make i1 hard to minimi ze enforcement risk.
It foll ows that 11 hi gh demand for rul es could persist even in the wa ke of an
across the board ban o n nonaudit co nsultin g. Reca ll that the 'check-the- box'
allegation against rul es-based GAA P can be res tated in pos iti ve terms: Rul es
enhance veri fiabili ty, causi ng a decrease in di fferences in measurement and
making non-compliance more ev ident. Now ass ume, as some assert,h' th aI the
audit fi rms engage in intense price competiti on (even as the number of firms
eq ui pped to aud it large ca pitali zat ion co mpanies has decreased to four and q uite
apart from competiti on for consultin g rents). Such price competition could
come at the cost of audi t quality. To see why, hypothesize the incenti ves of an
audit partner under pri ci ng press ure. Under Generall y Accepted Auditing
Standards, the audit process begins with an appraisal of the ri sk of compli ance
failu re at the client. The auditor's profess ional judgmenl concern ing the scope
of the testing to be conducted in the course of the audit fo ll ows from thi s ri sk
appraisal.'>· The scope of the tes ting in tu rn impacts on the audit fee - as the risk
increases, more tests are needed, more ti me mu st be spent, and the fee rises.
Rul es reco mmend themselves over principles in a hard cas h se nse at thi s point
in the scenari o. Chec k-the-box verifi ability gets the job done more quickl y and

", SEC Reporr, op. cit. n. 13. s. III.I.
'", See ibid ., s. I.e.
"' See S. Sunder, 'Rethinki ng the Structure of Accounting and Aud iting' . Yale ICF Worki ng
Paper No. 03-17 (29 May 2003) (available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/
papers.cfrn?abstracUd=41358 J » (last visited 26 January 2004).
'" Herwi tz & Barrett. op cit. 11. J 9. pp. 200-203 .
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predictably, maki ng it eas ier to state a price in advance and lock in a profit on
the engagement. Under a regime of principl es, the preparer wi ll have made fac t
se nsitive applicatio ns of the standards, necess itating a more labou r-intensive
audit. With principles, unex pected, time-co nsuming prob lems also are more
like ly to arise. In sum , professional price co mpetition, (0 the extent it ex ists,
also fu els th e demand for rules.

3.3

The legal profession compared

US aud itors, in demandi ng rules from their standard se ller. (rack the action s of
US lawyers; and US GAAP, in evolvi ng away from hroad principles toward
ru les, tracks the evol ution of US business law as a whole. Before telling their
cli ents that a course of action is proh ibi ted. lawye rs al so seek an exp lici t
statutory bar or a case on all fours. Business law and lawyers no longer
subsc ribe to the legal reali sts' view that fact spcc irk adj udi cation un der principles makes law more respo nsive.'" As an ex ample. com pare the o ld Uni form
Parlllers hip Act/" drafted early in the twent ieth century, with a Revised
Uni fo rm Parlnersh ip Ac t," drafted at the end of the cen tury. The fonn er is a
collec ti on of short, general state ments. The latte r is a labyrinthine affa ir that
reads li ke an atlempt to answe r every ques tion that ever arose in thi s hi story of
partnership governance. T he evol uti on of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) and the cases thereunde r over the last three decades has worked
si mila rl y. New legislati ve dra fts of the uee add layers of compli cations.
Today 's drafters no longer leave it to later case law to fill in the detail s. 1nstead
they pursue the impossible dream o f creating compl ete sets of instruction s, just
like the accountants . 7~ Meanw hil e, courts applyin g the uce have aba nd oned
ge neral ideas like liberal construction H and good faith. 7"
Many reasons for business law 's movement to rul es ca n be suggested. Co nfi dence in judicial dec ision-maki ng has dec lined even as the expen se of litigating
ques ti ons of interpretat ion ha s risen . 1n commercial law contexts the scope of
jury control over mi xed law and fac t qu estions expanded materiall y over the

'" See W.W. Bratton. ' Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century's Turn ' . 26 J.COI]),L.
(200 I) pp. 737. 746.
~, Uniform Partnership Act. 6 ViA 275 ( t 9 14).
'I Revised Uniform Partnership Act 6 UIA 1 ( 1997).
,; Compare the origi nal UCC Art. 9 and the revised Art. 9 on the perfec tion and prioJities of
seclLI'i ty interests. See UCC 5S. 9-30 t-9-318 3A ViA 859- t037. 38 VIA 33-386 ( 1972); UCC ss.
9-30 1-9-342.3 VIA 154-30 1 (2000).
l\ See G.E. Maggs. ' Karl Llewellyn's Fading Imprint on the Ju risprudence of the Unifonn
Commerci,,1 Code', 71 U. Culo. L ReI'. (2000) p. 54 1.
" W.W. Bratton. ' Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and Corporate Controt' .
100 Micll. L ReI'. (2002) pp. 89 1. 933-934.
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latter part of the twentieth century, destabilizing the expectations of business
people. There also circulates a general notion that specific instructions import
certainty that enhances economic welfare. Finally, lawyers, like auditors, turn
to rules because they want (Q reduce risk both for themselves and their clients. A

rule imports a safe harbour and control of future events where a standard does
not.

To sum up, GAAP and business law have moved to rules simultaneously.
Auditors, lawyers, and clients alike demand clear instructions, putting the
burden of clarity on the lawmaker. They thereby relieve themselves of the
burden of making judgments under uncertainty. Such judgments take time, cost
money. and disrupt client relations. This is not a healthy development. But the
fault lies neither in the proliferating rulebooks nor their drafters. The fault
occurs at the point of demand: Drafters will continue to generate rulebooks until
the demand ceases. Actors in practice will perceive the rulebooks to be inflexible and burdensome only wi th the cessation of the forces generating the
demand.

4.

RELATIVE MERITS OF RULES AND PRINCIPLES: IDEAL CONDITIONS
AND INCENTIVE INCOMPATIBILITY

For the sake of argument, let us assume that the auditor-client demand for
greater rule specificity ceases, freeing us to interrogate in a neutral policy space
the question whether GAAP should be articu lated in rules or principles. The
result will depend on the inquiry 's further assumptions. If an ideal professional
environment is hypothesized, in which the auditor works unconstrained by
pressures of time, price, and reputation, a strong case can be stated for a principles-based regime. But a plausible case can be stated for rules even under such
ideal conditions. The case for rules strengthens materially in an imperfect institutional framework, such as that prevailing respecting the audit function in the

US.
4.1

Cost savings and transparency

Rules-based accounting entails cost savings and enhances transparency. The
cost savings follow from the nature of the subject matter. Accounting standards
govern homogenou s, recurrent situations where the actors need ex ante instruc7
tion s and have incentives to invest in compliance. ' Such conditions tend to
justify a rul es- based approach. An across-the-board shift to principles would

1.'

See L. Kaplow. 'Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis'. 42 Dllke Ll. (1992)

pp. 557. 570-77.
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make sense on ly if the costs of consta nt revi sion of the rules to keep up with
unintended app li cations due to faulty drafting and regulatory arbitrage
outweighed the benefits of advance specificati on. GAAP does not appear to lie
anywhere near th at level of dysfun cti on. On thi s analys is, the indicated course
of reform is incremental change. The standard setter monitors the rules'
operation look ing to periodic amendment, adjusting categories so that reportin g
resu lts follow from the rules' operat ive principl es .7~
Transparency imports a second j ustification for rules. Recall that rule
co mpliance is more eas il y verified than principle compliance. 71 It follows that
rules decrease the risk of audit failure even as they import inflexibility.
Rules enh ance tran spare ncy for users of fi nancial statements as well as for
auditors. To see why, revi sit the legal realists' case for principles ove r rul es in
re spect of private law adj ud ication. That case presupposes that the law to fact
appl ication is exp lained and published in ajudicial op inion. The reported cases
give the practitione r an expanding body of fact sensitive appl ications, ever
better art ic ul ating the standard 's meaning. Over time, the accum ul ated case law
offers the practitioners a level of certainty not dissimilar to that of a rulebook ,
even as the principle's flexibility is retained. Meanwhile, the cases (and thu s the
substance of th e legal regi me) are open fo r public inspection.
The ongo ing rul es-based arl"icu lation of GAAP by FASB and other public
bodies works similarly .7~ But the appl ication of open-ended accounting principles by reportin g firm s and audi tors does nol. Financial statements and
footnotes are very summary docume nts. Deci sion maki ng about treatmen ts
goes on in a black box, evolving as a matte r of practice amongst insiders."N
There is no comparable moment of tran spa rency respec ting the law to fact
applicatio n. Thi s dimini shes the chance for ou tside eva luation. These law-to~
fact deci sions, meanw hil e, are not made by j udges empowered by the state.
They come from the prepa rers - the regul ated ac tors themselves - acting with
an in put of th e auditor's professional review. And a professional , even one
hi storically co nceived to be in an adversary posture to its client, is in a materi all y different position from a j udge. Adj ud icatory authority imports absolute

1•• The rule might be overinclusive; that is. it might bring in:tppropriatc transactions into a
given "lone of treatment. A rule also might be underinclusive; that is, il might allow a transaction
Ihal should be included in a Irealment calegory to be structured so as nOllo be included. See C. R.
Sunstein . ' Problems With RUles'. 83 Cal. L Rev. ( 1995) pp. 953. 995.
11 See lext accompanying n. 37 supra.
1. According 10 FASB , any bias toward rules in contemporary GAAP sterns from exactly Ihis
sort of law-to~faci development process. as rules are rewrillen 10 take into account different
transactiona l facls and interpretive opinions accumulate. FASB, Principles ApprO{IC/I. op. cit. n.
20. pp. 3-4.
,., The three per cent rule applied to SPEs provides a good example, see SIII"'(j text accompanying n. 50.
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power to say no. The outside professional can only suggest no, on pain of giving
up the client.
When confronting substandard fin ancials, loday's auditors are di sinclined
even to threaten to walk, much less actuall y to forego the rent flowin g from the
audit engagement. A serious incenti ve problem results, a problem that makes a
move to fl ex ibl e, open-ended principles ill advised at thi s time.

4.2

Flexibility and professional judgment

The case for principles-based accounting arises in large measure from the
descripti on of the perverse effects of rules. The principles case admits the force
of the rul es case but asserts that once rules come to dominate the accounting
regime, cumulative perverse effects cause the di sadvantages of rules to
outweigh the advantages. The more detail ed the set of exceptions, the greater
the chance that essenti ally similar tran sactions receive different accounting
treatments. Scope and treatment exceptions build inconsistencies into the
stand ard s, sacrificin g the integrity of the underl ying principles. Strategic
behav iour results, as preparers seek to exp loit the inconsistencies, des ignin g
compli ant transactions that subvert the principles the rules supposedly effectu ate. Meanwhil e, the proliferating exceptions fuel additional demand for explication from the standard setter. The responsive standard setter finds itself
attempting to articul ate a treatment for every conceivable scenario. But the
auempt always fails, for the goal of a perfec t, exhausti ve rulebook is unattainable.1IO
The case for principles at thi s point reverses the case for rules. Since the
standard setter cannot identify all pertinent business situations ex ante, it is not
clear why ex hausti ve instructi ons should be he ld out as a goal in the first place,
given that micro-level standard setting always results in inconsistencies. The
onl y party with all inform ati on respecting a given tran saction is the reporting
company itself. It foll ows thatlhe company's preparer, operating in good fai th ,
is more likel y to deri ve an appropriate treatment when applyin g a principle than
is a rulernaking standard setter acting ex ante. With principles, companyspecific knowledge and the regulatory framework interact fl exibly and the
regul ation's purpose is more likely to be effectuated.~'
Thus described, principles-based accounting not only permits but also
requires exercises of professional judgment by auditors and actors at reporting
companies.R2 Sir David T weedie, chairman of the lASB , stressed the importance

.., SEC Report, loc. cit. n. 13, s.l.e.
" Ibid., s. I.D.
01 Schipper. loco cit. n. 17, p. 61.
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of profe ssional judgment in a principl es based system in hi s 2002 Congressional testimony:
'We favo ur an approach that requires the com pany and its auditor to take a step back
and consider whether the accounting suggested is consistent with the underlyin g
principle. Thi s is not a soft option. Our appro<lCh 1\~q Llire s both companies and their
auditors to exercise professional judgment in ti ll' puhlil' interest. Our approach requires a strong commitment fro m preparers to i"inancial statements that provide a
fai th ful representati on of all transacti ons and a stron g l'Ollllllilment from auditors to
res ist client pressures. It wi ll not work withoutlhl'sl' L'o llllnitments .. .'K.'
Ha ving heard th e case for principles, we must rl'! urn III til l' audito r-cl ient relationship to inquire into the expected quality
pnllcssillilill judg me nt s. If recent
hi story is predicti ve, the prognosis is not good. 1':vL'1l as iluditors have been
disempowe red with res pect to the ir c li ent s. so IIll' l'liL'llIS ha v..: bl:l:1l g uided by
short-term so lic itude for the ir stoc k pricl:s ratlll'l' than i"iddit y 10 illTounting
princ ipl es. Proponents of princ ipl es see m 10 hc li l'Vl' Ih ;ll rdorlllulatin g. rules
into standard s by itse lf solves these problell is. (jUI thl: bl:\ icl' is unfounded. The
princ iples . It w ill take
recent hi story of aud it failure has been no res pecte r
more than a new approac h to sl<lnd<lrd se ttin g brin g incentive compatibility to
thi s comp li ance e nvironment.
The SEC displays sensiti vil y to thi s problem in its SOA re port on principlesbased account ing. Th e repo rt' s defini tion of an ideal prin c iples-based standard
makes an inte res ting com pari son wi th Sir David Tweedi e's approach:

or

or

.... [T]he optimal principles-based accounting standard in volves a conci se statement
of substant ive accounting princi ples where the accou ntin g objective has been incorporated as an integral part of the standard and where few, jf any, exceptions or inter·
nal inconsistencies are included in the standard. Further, such a standard should
prov ide an appropri ate amount of implementation guidance given the nature of the
c lass of transactions or events and should be devoid of bright-line tests. Finall y, such
a standard should be consistent with , and deri ve from , a coherent conceptual framework of financ ial reporting. ,<,
Where Tweedi e lays the responsibili ty for law to fact determina tion s sq uarely
o n the regulated actors, the SEC hesitates. It takes a step back from the case for
principles to e ndorse constituent de mand for speci fi c ity. It the n shifts th e
burden bac k 10 the standard sette r to provide 'a n appropriate amount of

"' Testimony of Sir Duvid Tweedie Before the Senate Comrnillee o n Banking. Ho using and
Urb'lIl Affairs ( 14 February 2(02).
"' SEC Report, op . cit . n. 13. s. I.e.
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implementation guidance.' Bald statements of principles, says the SEC,
provide users insufficient structure in which to frame their professional
judgment. The 'principles' need to be 'defined specifically.' The SEC calls this
an 'objectives-oriented' approach to principles-based standard setting. As an
exemplar, it holds out PASS's recent revision of the standard for mergers. ttI
The regime envisaged by the SEC appears to hold out the benefit of a
decrease in the level of reporting detail. At the same time, comparability of
treatment across different issuers would be enhanced. But the decrease in
complexity implies a concomitant loss of tran sparency, since commonality of
treatment obscures particulars in the economics of differing underlying transactions. M The SEC sees these as matters to be traded off by the standard setter:
'[T]he task of the standard setter [is] to determine the trade offs among
relevance, reliability, and comparability C... ) in (... ) an effort to find the "sweet
spot,,·87. Two additional SEC instructions to the standard setter stand out: (1)
economic substance should drive the development and scope of the standards,&!!
and (2) no scope and treatment exceptions should be conceded. 89
A question must be asked about the SEC's vision of accounting standards.
How does the regime simultaneously articulate precise instructions and eschew
all exceptions from its categories? So doing would amount to a considerable
achievement. The drawing of lines is intrinsic to regulation. Line-drawing is
what case law under principles is supposed to do. It is not at all clear that
financial reporting principles differ from any other body of regulations in this
regard. So, to the extent the SEC looks toward a new regime in which all
standards mesh like the parts of a well-running machine, it is likely to be disappointed. Such perfect engineering is no more likely here than in any other regulatory context. 1IO The search for 'sweet spots' is better consigned to sporting and
other physical activities.
The SEC, in its search for a regime of broadly stated standards that incorporate no exceptions, might be better off abandoning the rubric of principlesbased accounting. The system envisioned more accurately would be character91
ized as a one of tough, general rules. Such a regime holds out advantages. For
example, it presumably would prohibit whole classes of aggressive treatments
tolerated in recent years, particularly those facilitating earnings management.
But if this is the SEC's intent, a question arises: In the present political and

~ Ibid , s. I.C. I.E.
~ The comments in the text draw on FASB, Principles Approach, op. cit. n. 20. p. 7.
~ Ibid .
.. Ibid .
... Ibid, s. IV .D.
'OJ See FASB, Principles Approach, op. cit. n. 20, p 6.
,,' FASS's Proposal respecting Principles in effect warns audit firms and issuers of this when
il poinls out that principles will mean more volatility in reported earni ngs figures. Ibid, pp. 7-8.
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institutional contex t how likely is it that reporting companies, their audirors,
and thei r fr iend s in Washington wou ld permit FASB to use the rubric of principles-based accou nting to usher in a new era of strict treatments? Even as the
PCAOB takes steps to reg ulate the a udit profess ion, the an swer mu st be, ve ry
unlikely.
As a practi ca l matter, then, the projected move to principles will have to be
arr iculated in the form of general but flexible guidelines - what lawye rs call
'standards. ""
Choices of trea tment will have to be made and th e quality of preparer and
aud itor judgments wi ll matter. The SEC warns that principles-based accoun ting
im plicates a more expens ive, time-consumin g audi t process. Th e SEC anti cipates that , in order to rev iew preparer judgment s, audit firm s will have to hire
ex pe nsive personnel with experti se in comple x tran sactions. II al so anticipates
that acti ve audit comm illee overs ight and olh er strong enforce ment agents wi ll
be required if the system is lO work . Finally, it advi ses audit ors and preparers to
generate ex ten sive paper records respecting treatm ent deci sions so as to
pos ition th emse lves to defend their good faith .'"
In effec t the SEC as ks users of fin ancial statements to tru st in the effec tiveness of the PCAOB to create a compl iance environmc nt vc ry different from the
one preva ilin g - a wonderful new wo rl d o f accountin g. Th e qu es tion is not
whether the reg ime it projects would he an impro vc llll' llt on the statu s quo; it
wo uld be. The quesLion is whet her the ideal world thu s projl'l· tCtl is J"c;'ls ible in
prac ti ce with out uni ntend ed e ffects in the form of poor profess ional judgment s.
It is too soon in the US reform process for an affirmati ve an swe r.

5.

CONCL USI ON

US GAAP, even as il has moved to rul es, continues to contai n many principles
and holds out many cho ices of treatment. Indepe nd ent auditors are supposed to
make reference 10 the principl es in fillin g in the ine vitabl e gaps in the rules and
in answe ring ques ti ons of interpretation under the ru les. Such law to fac t appl ica ti ons should with some frequency have bee n leadin g auditors to say no to
agg ressive treatmen ts chosen by their clients. But such nay sayi ng has not been
the practi ce. Appl ication o f principles in the mann er contemplat ed requires
exercises of judgment , exercises th ai captured a uditors are di sabled from

'J: D. Kennedy. ' Form and SubslJnce in Private Law Adjudication', 89 HmT. L ReI'. ( 1976)
p. 1685. offers the cla.~s ic description of .~tandards in American jurisprudence. America' s princi ples-based accounting advocates would be well advised to read it.
," SEC RI!I,urr. op. cil. n. 13. s. 111.1.
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making. Principles-based accounting only works when the actor applying it
takes responsibility for its judgments.
The US accounting crisis stems less from the form of GAAP standards,
whether rules- or principles-based. than from their application to fact and
enforcement. The system 's problems ari se out of the profess ional relatio n
between auditors and clients. It follow s that SOA correctly prioritises professional regulation in the form of the new peADB. It is less clear that rules-based
GAAP should be a present law reform target. Until the enforcement mechani sm
works more reliabl y - and the PCAOB is only beginning 10 task of correction a move to princi ples-based accounting could aggravate the crisis of confidence.

